Markets passively accept a convex cone of cash ‡ows that contains the the nonnegative cash ‡ows. Di¤erent markets are de…ned by di¤erent cones and conditions are established to exclude the possibility of arbitrage between markets. Operationally these cones are de…ned by positive expectation under a concave distortion of the distribution function of the cash ‡ow delivered to market. Firms access risky assets and risky liabilities and regulatory bodies ensure that su¢ cient capital is put at stake to make the risk of excess loss acceptable to taxpayers. Firms approach equity markets for funding and can come into existence only if they can raise su¢ cient equity capital. Firms that are allowed to exist approach debt markets for favorable funding opportunities. The costs of debt limit the amount of debt. Firms with lognormally distributed and correlated assets and liabilities are analysed for their required capital, their optimal debt levels, the value of the option to put losses back to the taxpayer, the costs of debt and equity, and the level of …nally reported equity in the balance sheet. The relationship between these entities and the risk characteristics of a …rm are analysed and reported in detail.
Introduction
Financial markets are generally modeled as counterparties for market participants permitting such entities to trade in both directions, buy from or sell to market at the going market price. Though market participants are seen as optimizing agents, the …nancial market itself passively accepts a range of so-called traded cash ‡ows. When we analyze the behavior of economic agents in market economies, the counterparty to each transaction by an economic agent is not another economic agent, but the market. These are the basic tenets of the modeling of markets in general equilibrium as set out for example in Arrow and Hahn (1971) , Debreu (1959) . By virtue of accepting trades in both directions the set of cash ‡ows acceptable to the market is closed under negation. It is also closed under addition and scaling and is therefore a linear subspace of the space of all possible cash ‡ows. This model of marketed cash ‡ows is central to the no arbitrage theory of …nancial markets as described for example in Du¢ e (2003) .
The above view of markets is central to much of modern …nancial analysis and it is central to the law of one price and the no arbitrage theory of markets with its many implications. We shall abandon this view of markets by recognizing up front that terms of trade with the market depend on the direction of trade. When buying from market one pays the ask price but when we sell to market we receive the lower bid price. The market buys at bid and sells at ask. As a consequence the set of cash ‡ows acceptable to market is not closed under negation. We shall however, continue to treat it as closed under addition and scaling.
With our revised view of markets we address the classical questions of corporate …nance. Traditionally a corporation accesses random cash ‡ows as assets and …nances the purchase in debt and equity markets (Merton, 1973 (Merton, , 1974 (Merton, , 1977 . The …rm consists of a nonnegative but random asset value that is unchanged by …nancing choices (Modigliani and Miller (1958) ). Debt is issued to capture tax advantages that are limited by exposure to default. In addition, there may be additional costs associated with bankruptcy (Leland (1994) , Leland and Toft (1997) ).
We shall expand this view by modeling a corporation as accessing both random cash ‡ows as assets and another set of potentially unbounded random cash ‡ows as liabilities. For examples one may take long short hedge funds, insurance liabilities and a variety of swap contracts. Such a model has recently been proposed in Madan (2009) and studied further in Eberlein and Madan (2009) . It is now possible that the liabilities may dominate the assets and the …rm cannot be permitted to exist as a limited liability entity if it is insu¢ ciently capitalized. We follow Madan (2009) and determine the required capital levels as a function of the risk structure of the …rm. It is possible that capital markets are unwilling to supply the capital required at a su¢ cient enough level. In this case the …rm is not allowed to exist. Hence, contrary to the structure of …rms in the Modigliani and Miller (1958) model, …nancial markets determine the size of the real economy by a precise computation that we illustrate. The size of the real economy and the number of risk structures that are allowed to exist depends critically on risk exposures, the associated capital requirements and the willingness of capital markets to fund the same.
Once a …rm is allowed to exist as a limited liability entity, it accesses for free the option to put excessive losses back to the economy. This is an asset of the …rm that should be reported on its balance sheet and is held by the equity holders. It was valued recently for the major US banks in Eberlein and Madan (2009) as at the end of the calendar year 2008. Furthermore, the …rm may also decide to issue debt securities. In our model, unlike Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1997) there are no tax advantages to debt nor are there any bankruptcy costs. Debt is issued to access favorable …nancing terms by designing securities that appeal to investors in debt markets. However, there are costs to issuing debt, described here in some detail, that limit the extent of debt that may be issued. Our …rms issue the maximum allowable debt and the optimal debt level is reached on meeting a funding constraint.
The static model of Leland (1994) Cohen and Elliott (2008) . For the moment this is a subject for future research.
Our plan is to …rst formally de…ne …nancial markets. We then take a stochastic balance sheet seen as the joint random process for assets and liabilities and show how one may compute the capital required for existence. The second step is to determine whether the …rm can exist as an all equity …rm. If it can exist, we value the limited liability option to put excessive losses back to the taxpayer or the general economy. Finally we determine the amount of debt the …rm will issue. From the inputs of balance sheet risk characteristics that describe the joint probability law of the random assets and liabilities, we determine as outputs, the required capital, the indicator variable for …rm existence, if this is unity, -we determine the value of the option to put losses to the taxpayer, and -…nally the debt level.
We close the theoretical discussion by exhibiting a typical balance sheet that takes into consideration all these items. We then go on to construct a variety of selectively generated bivariate Gaussian stochastic balance sheets and we report on the relationships between a …rm's risk characteristics and its …nal balance sheet.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our model for …nancial markets. In Section 3 we present the methods for computing capital required for existence. Section 4 explains how to value the option to put losses to the taxpayer if the …rm is allowed to exist. The determination of the debt level is detailed in Section 5. Section 6 presents a typical balance sheet recognizing all the items analysed here. The analysis of our selectively generated balancesheets is presented in Section 7. Section 8 concludes.
Modeling Financial Markets
We model markets as satisfying the law of two prices as opposed to one price. In keeping with the classical model for markets, economic agents may trade prospective cash ‡ows with the market in any amount at the going bid or ask price. The market sells at the ask price and buys at the bid price so agents buy at ask and sell at bid. The bid price is below the ask price. The set of zero cost cash ‡ows that one may deposit in the market therefore include any positive multiple of such a cash ‡ow and hence this set of cash ‡ows is closed under scaling by a positive constant. Furthermore, if two di¤erent zero cost cash ‡ows may be deposited in the market then one may also deposit the sum. The set of zero cost cash ‡ow that one may deposit in the market is then closed under addition. It follows that the set of zero cost cash ‡ows economic agents may deposit in the market is a convex cone. We further recognize that any agent may deposit in any market at zero cost any nonnegative cash ‡ow. The convex cone of cash ‡ows acceptable to a market therefore contains the set of nonnegative cash ‡ows. Markets therefore accept at zero cost a set of risks that satisfy the axioms for acceptable risks as set out in Artzner, Delbaen, Eber and Heath (1999), and studied further in Carr, Geman and Madan (2001), Jaschke and Kuchler (2001) and Follmer and Schied (2004) .
The classical market of liquid markets with its law of one price allows one to trade in both directions at the same price and so it is also closed under negation. This property makes the set of cash ‡ows acceptable to the market a half space de…ned as the set of all cash ‡ows with positive expectation under a single risk neutral and unique probability measure Q: Once we pass to the law of two prices we lose closure under negation and we have just a convex cone containing the nonnegative cash ‡ows but no longer a half space associated with one risk neutral measure. However, we recognize that every convex set is also de…ned by the intersection of all the half spaces that contain it, and this is also true for convex cones. Since our cone of acceptable cash ‡ows contains the nonnegative cash ‡ows, we have a whole collection M of probability measures Q 2 M; with the property that a cash ‡ow is acceptable to the market at zero cost just if its expectation is positive under each measure Q 2 M: Without loss of generality we may take the set M of measures to be a convex set as we may always include all the convex combinations. Every market is then de…ned by a convex cone of zero cost cash ‡ows acceptable to the market, and this cone has associated with it a convex set of probability measures Q 2 M with acceptability equivalently de…ned as positive expectation under each Q 2 M. We therefore refer to …nancial markets for the law of two prices as conic, given that they are de…ned by convex cones of acceptable cash ‡ows.
We may model di¤erent markets using di¤erent convex cones of acceptable cash ‡ows. For two markets we may have cones of acceptable zero cost cash ‡ows A 1 ; A 2 with associated sets of measures M 1 ; M 2 : One may then wonder if the two markets may be arbitraged by buying some cash ‡ow at the ask price from one market and selling it to the other market at its higher bid price. Now for any cash ‡ow X we determine the markets ask price a(X) by noting that a(X) X 2 A or equivalently that
and so
Similarly one shows that
Now provided the set of supporting measures
and the bid price of market two is never above the ask price of market one. Hence one may employ di¤erent cones to conceptualize di¤erent markets provided the set of supporting measures have a nonempty intersection. One may show by classic separation arguments, separating A 1 from A 2 that this condition for the absence of arbitrage is also necessary. Models for markets may be constructed by specifying intersecting sets of supporting measures. However, this is not that simple a task. Operational cones were de…ned by Cherny and Madan (2009) for cones that depend solely on the probability law of the cash ‡ow being assessed. For such cones one may proceed with acceptability being linked to positive expectation under concave distortion. One may take any concave distribution function on the unit interval (u), 0 u 1 and de…ne a random variable X with distribution function F (x) to be acceptable provided
In this case the set of supporting measures consist of all equivalent probabilities with densities Z such that
where (a) is the conjugate of ;
Cherny and Madan (2009) introduced parametric families of distortions (u); that de…ne a decreasing sequence of cones as one raises with the limit as goes to in…nity being just the nonnegative cash ‡ows. Observing that expectations under concave distortions are also expectations under the measure change 0 (F (x)) they suggested that for x tending to negative in…nity and F (x) tending to zero, one should induce loss aversion by ensuring that 0 (u) tends to in…nity as u tends to zero. Similarly as x tends to positive in…nity and u tends to unity one should ensure against being enticed by large gains by requiring that 0 (u) tends to zero. A suggested distortion that has these properties is the distortion termed minmaxvar for which
We generalize this distortion to a two parameter one that allows di¤erent rates of convergence to in…nity and zero at the left and right end points of the unit interval de…ned by
For this distortion the rate of loss aversion is determined by while the absence of gain enticement is controlled by : We call this distortion minmaxvar2 for its two parameters. We could model di¤erent markets using di¤erent levels of loss aversion and absence of gain enticement. However, we have to …rst enquire whether the sets of supporting measures associated with di¤erent distortions have a nonempty intersection, thereby ensuring the absence of arbitrage opportunities between markets. For this we …rst show how one evaluates bid and ask prices using distortions. For the bid price one must have that
Note now that
and so we must have that
or that
From the relationship between suprema and in…ma we observe that
Let (u) be a distortion. Suppose we have another distortion e (u). Now if there exists a distribution function of a random variable X, F (x) such that we may buy this random variable at the ask price for and sell to e at the bid for a pro…t then we have an arbitrage. Let a denote the ask price of while b is the bid for e : For a < b we have arbitrage.
Now the bid and ask prices for e ; are respectively (noting that
We may also write that
Let G(u) = F 1 (u) and note that G is an increasing function. We may write the di¤erence between ask and bid prices as
The last inequality follows on noting that for all concave distortions (u) u and so (1 u) + e (u) 1: Hence the set of measures supporting concave distortions have a nonempty intersection and arbitrage is excluded when modeling di¤erent markets using di¤erent concave distortions.
Our model for corporate entities in real economies sees the corporations as interacting with a variety of stakeholders. Corporations have a multitude of complementary and competing interests at issue with a variety of stakeholders. We quote from John and Senbet (1998), "The pay-o¤ structure of the claims of di¤erent classes of stakeholders are di¤erent. The degree of alignment of interests with those of the agents in the …rm who control the major decisions in the …rm are also di¤erent. This gives rise to potential con ‡icts among stakeholders, and these incentive con ‡icts have come to be known as "agency (principal-agent) problems." Left alone, each class of stakeholders pursues its own interest which may be at the expense of other stakeholders. We can classify agency problems on the basis of con ‡icts among particular parties to the …rm, such as con ‡icts between stockholders (principals) and management (agent) ("managerial agency" or "managerialism"), between stockholders (agents) and bondholders ("debt agency"), between the private sector (agent) and the public sector ("social agency"), and even between the agents of the public sector (e.g. regulators) and the rest of society or taxpayers ("political agency")."
We distinguish in our study and formulation of a corporation four separate stakeholders, the stockholders, the debtholders, the …rm itself or its internal managers and decision makers, and the external taxpayer who provides limited liability to the …rm even if it was debt free. We take the view that the counterparties of the corporation are not particular stockholders, bondholders, managers, and taxpayers but stock markets, bond markets, markets for managerial talents and markets for the creation of limited liability entities. Each of these markets decides on the residual risks it will hold as appropriate and these are given by potentially di¤erent convex cones of random variables that we denote by A S ; A D ; A M ; and A T :
We take all four cones to be determined by di¤erent parameter settings for the distortion minmaxvar2: The taxpayers have the most loss aversion and the highest absence of gain enticement and we suppose that for them = = :75:
The managers of a …rm we take to be somewhat more tolerant of losses than taxpayers but they are induced by gains and so we suppose = :5 and = 0:25: The debt holders are tolerant of losses but unlike equity holders and …rm managers they are not enticed by gains and prefer to see their principal back. They have a cone with = 0:1 but = 0:2: Equity holders however are both tolerant of losses and enticed by gains with = = 0:025:
We now have a complete speci…cation of the four markets the corporation has to interact with and we can compute the bid and ask prices for cash ‡ows traded in each market. We may write all prices as distorted expectations of cash ‡ows and we abbreviate and write
Determining Required Capital
We have remarked that the classic Mertonian …rm has no need for capital reserves as the value of the option to put losses back on the taxpayer or economy is zero by construction. The worst that happens is that assets go to zero wiping out debt and equity holders but there are no adverse consequences for the general economy. Debt holders may worry about there being su¢ cient equity capital as reserve protecting against their loss exposure. Our concern is not with protecting debt holders and nor should this be the concern of regulatory bodies. We recognize that corporations may access random and potentially unbounded liabilities with the possibility that come year end, or whatever suitable horizon one works with, we …nd that the random liabilities exceed assets in place and losses either fall on counterparties in the economy who are not made whole, or there is an explicit bail out with counterparties being made whole by the general taxpayer and then the losses fall uniformly across the community of taxpayers. Every limited liability entity accessing random and potentially unbounded liabilities should ensure that there is a su¢ cient stake up front from the organizers of the enterprise or else the enterprise should not be allowed to exist and get the limited liability status.
The upfront stake is reserve cash capital whose purpose is to cover for losses if and when they should arise. The regulatory body granting the limited liability has to consider the total cash ‡ow that is being accessed and this should be acceptable to taxpayers. For random assets A(T ) and random liabilities L(T ) with a capital stake of M we have to ensure that
A simple computation reveals (see Madan (2009) 
Given a model for the evolution of the random or stochastic components of the balance sheet or the joint law for A(T ); L(T ) and the parameters of the taxpayer cone one may determine the capital M that must be placed at stake to get the limited liability license from the taxpayers making the proposed business generally economically acceptable. From the viewpoint of the general economy the base law for A(T ); L(T ) to be distorted is a risk neutral law for one has to ensure at a minimum a positive expectation after risk compensation. Hence we shall de…ne acceptability by distorting risk neutral laws. The actual funds the …rm has to raise in the capital markets is
By way of a simple example helpful in illustrating the issues involved consider the model of geometric Brownian motion for the random assets and liabilities with correlated Brownian motions. Risk neutrally we suppose that
For an annual horizon (T =
Firm Existence and the Value of the Taxpayer Put
We …rst consider the possibility of an all equity …rm approaching the equity markets for funding. The equity market has high tolerance for losses and may be easily enticed by gains. For this reason we model the equity market with a wide cone and S = S = 0:025: We could take zero values and then we have a single risk neutral measure and no bid ask spread. We allow for a small spread and relate this spread to the cost of entering …nancial markets. In a liquid market there are no costs to entering the market as the round trip cost is zero given that we trade in both directions at the same price. For markets with two prices, bid and ask, de…ned by cones of acceptable cash ‡ows you sell to market at bid but you have to buy back at ask and the di¤erence is a cost that must be funded upfront. The di¤erence may be held as cash reserves in recognition of the expected cost of reversing the trade. These costs address the separate treatment of assets and liabilities when transacting in two price markets. On the asset side one unwinds by selling to market and one receives the bid price. On the liability side however one unwinds by buying from market and this takes place at the ask price. Hence all assets are to be marked at their bid prices while all liabilities are to be marked at their ask prices. When we issue liabilities like stocks or bonds we receive for them the bid price, but we mark then up to the ask price we expect to pay for an unwind. The di¤erence is a cost we incur and hold as reserve.
The …rm we approach the equity market with has …nal limited liability cash ‡ow for maturity T = 5 of
The bid price from the equity market is given by
while the ask price will be
We receive bJ but mark the liability at aJ and the funds raised must provide us with
The all equity …rm can come into existence provided
For our example, we have bJ = 35:4621 and aJ = 39:0824 and the left hand side of the above inequality is 30:8602. As a result the all equity …rm can come into existence. On the other hand if equity markets were more averse to losses and less responsive to gains with S = :05; S = :05 then bJ = 33:8428 and the left hand side is 34:5178 and the …rm has insu¢ cient funds.
The option to put losses back to the taxpayer has the payo¤
that is an asset of the …rm to be valued at the bid price for the market to which it could be sold. If we temporarily suppose that this is the equity market, the bid price is 9:8789: We later relax this assumption in Section 7 where we construct the reported balance sheet.
Determining Debt Levels
If a …rm cannot exist as an all equity …rm, we show later under conservative assumptions that it cannot exist by issuing debt as well. Assuming we have a …rm that can exist as an all equity …rm, we consider debt issues of pure discount bonds with a face value F and maturity of T = 5 years. On a debt issue of face value F the cash ‡ow to bond holders is
CF D = min(V (T ); F )
while equity holders receive
The bid prices for these securities in the bond and equity markets are 
We …rst note that if the equity and debt markets had the same cone of acceptable risks then the bid and ask prices for debt bD; aD and equity with debt, bJD; aJD add up to the corresponding all equity prices bJ; aJ: There are no advantages to issuing debt when evaluated at the bid or the ask. In general as the bid prices are computed as an in…mum over expectations taken with respect to a set of measures and ask prices are supremums we have that bD + bJD bJ aD + aJD aJ
When the cones are the same in both the debt and equity markets we may observe the required equalities as follows. Let X = CF D and Y = JD: The distribution function of J = X + Y for values a < F is just F Y (a): Hence we note that for a < F;
For values a > F the probability that
Hence we have that
A similar argument supports the additivity of ask prices under the same cone.
When the cone of the debt market is smaller and the set of supporting measures larger than for the equity market the sum of the bid prices for debt and equity with debt will be lower than the all equity bid price and similarly the sum of the ask prices will be larger than aJ: Now the value of a …rm is the cost of acquiring the …rm or a comparable …rm. This value is given by the ask prices and we value all our liabilities, debt and equity at the ask prices. From this perspective there is an advantage to issuing debt and appealing to the higher pricing of liabilities in the debt market with a view to raising the value of the …rm. The amount of debt one can issue is however limited by the constraint (3) as eventually the cost of debt rises and one hits the boundary of the constraint with insu¢ cient funds available to cover the reserve costs of debt issue.
We demonstrate that the when the debt market is more conservative than the equity market as represented by a debt market distortion e (u) that everywhere dominates the equity market distortion (u) then the …rm value measured by the sum of aD plus aJD is increasing in the face value of debt. Hence the optimal debt is de…ned by equality
We shall now use here the fact that for positive random variables X with distribution function G(x) the bid and ask prices, b(X); a(X) respectively are
To observe that …rm value increases with the face value of debt o¤ered we note that the ask price of debt for a face value F and a …rm value distribution function H(v) and density h(v) is given by
while the ask price of equity given debt is
The derivative of …rm value with respect to the face value of debt is
where the last inequality follows from the assumption of debt markets being more conservative.
We de…ne by g(F ) the funding gap for debt at face value F as
For an all equity …rm that is allowed to exist we have that
We now observe that the derivative of this funding gap is positive as
It follows that if the funding gap is initially positive at zero debt it will grow as debt is introduced and so if a …rm cannot exist as an all equity …rm, it cannot exist with positive debt. Furthermore, for a …rm that is allowed to exist with a negative initial funding gap at zero debt, there will be at most one solution to the equation for a zero funding gap as the derivative is universally positive. We also observe that as F tends to in…nity the funding gap tends to
This is the funding gap for …nancing as an all equity …rm in the debt market and we suppose this funding gap is positive for a su¢ ciently conservative debt distortion e : In such a case there is exactly one solution to the equation for a zero funding gap and we we have a formula for the optimal debt F in terms of the distribution function of …rm value given by
In our example the highest level of debt that can be funded is a face value of 23: At this level the ask price of the debt security is 14:3752 and the value of equity with debt at this level is 26:2107: The increase in the value of the …rm is 1:5035:
Balance Sheet Construction
We now present the construction of the balance sheet to be reported. We begin with the complete markets balance sheet with all items valued under the single risk neutral measure and the value of the tax payer put recognized as an asset of the …rm. In this case we have for the assets, M + A 0 + P where P is the value of the put option. On the liability side we have L 0 and the value of the all equity …rm J or equivalently in the presence of debt we write the value of debt D and the value of equity with debt JD: The balance sheet re ‡ects the equality
We next recognize that in our incomplete markets the debt and equity are carried on the books at the ask price for their respective markets and their cones. These are the cones A D ; A S : We have to raise the extra funds in reserves and this is accomplished by adding the di¤erence between the mark and the complete market value to both sides of equation (5) to get the equality However, both the debt and equity markets deliver their bid prices instead of the complete markets value. We thus add the di¤erence to cash reserves for the assets and to equity for the liabilities. This yields
We have already ensured that the funds raised are su¢ cient as per equation (3).
This balance sheet reports the equity value, JR at JR = aJD + D bD + JD bJD that includes the liability valued at the ask plus the shortfall associated with raising funds in a conic market. The value of equity plus debt equals net assets plus cash reserves made up of externally required capital plus reserves associated with the cost of …nancing, and the value of the tax payer put. We now make a …nal adjustment to the value of the taxpayer put. Currently it stands as valued at the base risk neutral measure. We illustrated earlier in Section 4, a value taken at the bid price for the equity market cone A S : However, this put option is not an explicitly traded contract in the equity market. It comes into existence when the …rm is created by its owner managers who then organize the …nancing structure. The value one may realize for it may then have to come from the managerial market where the cones are narrower and the bid price in this market could be lower. If we mark this put option value down to its managerial bid price then we reduce the reported equity down by the mark down in this put option value. This value is given in our example by 3:8490: The complete markets value was 10:7166: The reported equity is now
where P is the complete markets put value and bP is the bid price in the managerial market. On the assets side we have
The rest of the liability side includes
In our example the …nal balance sheet is as presented in Table 1 with zero coupon debt issued at a face value of 23 for a …ve year maturity. We investigate the relationships between the risk characteristics of the balance sheet and seven outputs of interest in the corporate balance sheet, for …rms that are allowed to exist on account of being able to raise enough capital in the equity markets. These outputs are the level of required capital (RC) as determined by the taxpayer cone. The cost of debt in the debt market (CD), the cost of equity post debt issue in the equity market (CJD), the value of the taxpayer put as valued in the managerial market (bP ), the face value of debt issued (F ) and the level of debt (aD) and reported equity (JR) as they appear in the …nal balance sheet. We investigate these matters here for …rms with a Gaussian model underlying the randomness in assets and liabilities. The initial asset level is set at 100: For the initial level of liabilities we take 5 settings of 10; 25; 50; 75; and 90: We allow for three level of the interest rate at 2:5%; 5%; and 10%: The maturity of the debt has three levels of 5; 10 and 15 years. For the asset and liability volatilities we take three level each of :15; :3; and :6: The correlations are set 7 levels of :75; :5; :25; 0; :25; :5; and :75: In all we have 5 3 3 3 3 7 = 2835 potential Gaussian balance sheets.
Apart from the …rm's risk characteristics we have to specify the structure of the taxpayer, debt market, equity market and managerial market cones of market acceptable risks. These are given by the level of ; and ; the coe¢ cients for loss aversion and absence of gain enticement in the respective markets. For our …rst cone the values of in the four markets are :75; :1; :025; and :5 respectively for the taxpayer, debt, equity and managerial markets. The corresponding values for are :75; :2; :025; and :25:
Our second set of cones just opens up the taxpayer cone to levels of ; set at :5 instead of :75: Finally in our third cone we set the taxpayer cone back to the level of :75 for ; and narrow the debt market cone to = :15 and = :3:
For our …rst set of cones, and for each of our 2835 potential balance sheets we …rst simulate 100000 scenarios for the random assets and liability levels at year end. The required capital is then determined in accordance with equation (1) . We then evaluate whether the …rm can raise su¢ cient capital to actually come into existence as de…ned by equation (2) . Unlike the Mertonian world, not all …rms are allowed to exist. For our …rst cone we found that 1536 out of 2835 …rms are allowed to exist. For a more generous taxpayer cone with ; at :5; the number of …rms allowed to exist goes up marginally by an additional 36 …rms to 1572 …rms. We therefore concentrate attention on the …rst and third of our sets of market cones, that di¤er in the size of the debt market cone with the third being narrower. We …nd that the presence of risky liabilities helps the existence of …rms as it reduces the need for funding from equity markets and helps meet the required constraint (2). For …rms with the level risky liabilites at 90 only 9 failed to meet the criterion for existence. For the lower levels of risky liabilities at 75; 50; 25 and 10 the numbers that failed to exist were 18; 207; 498; and 567 respectively. Our further analysis is restricted to the 1536 …rms that come into existence and we report on the results using the …rst and third set of market cones that we shall refer to as the base debt cone and the narrow debt cone.
For these existing …rms we determine the face value of debt (F ) issued at the maturity in question in accordance with equation (3) . We may then determine the cost of debt (CD), the cost of equity post debt (CJD), the managerial bid price for the taxpayer put option (bP ); the level at which debt is marked (aD); and the level of reported equity (JR): For each of these six items plus the required capital (RC) we analyse by regression the e¤ects of liability levels (L0); the e¤ects of interest rates (r); the maturity (T ); the asset volatility ( A ); the liability volatility ( L ) and the level of correlation ( ): The levels of L0; r; T; A ; L and are proxied by dummy variables to give six sets of explanatory variables with respectively 5; 3; 3; 3; 3 and 7 variables. There were not enough surviving …rms at L0 = 10 and so we used 4 dummy variables in the regressions on the liability levels for the levels 25; 50; 75 and 90: In each case we regressed all 7 variables of interest RC; CD; CJD; bP; F; aD and JR on dummy variables for the levels of L0; r; T; A ; L and : The result of these regressions consists of 6 matrices of coe¢ cients of dimension 4; 3; 3; 3; 3 and 7 by 7: The six matrices are in duplicate, one for the base debt cone, and the other for the narrow debt cone. The columns for RC and bP are the same for the base debt cone and the narrow debt cone as these values are independent of the debt market cone. The results are presented in Tables 2 and 3 for the base debt cone and the narrow debt cone respectively. We comment on the relationship of each of the seven independent variables on the set of six regressors in turn.
The required capital (RC) rises with the level of risky liabilities, and is independent of rates and maturity. Furthermore, the level of capital required rises with asset and liability volatility and decreases with an increase in the correlation.
The cost of debt rises with the level of risky liabilities, is independent of rates, and rises with maturity. The cost of debt decreases with asset volatility and rises with the volatility of the liabilities. It is invariant to correlation.
The cost of equity post debt also rises with the level of risky liabilities, is insensitive to rates and rises with maturity. It rises with asset volatility and declines somewhat with the volatility of liabilities. It also falls somewhat with correlation.
The value of the taxpayer put rises with the level of risky liabilities and maturity and is insensitive to rates. It rises with asset volatilities, falls with liability volatility and correlation.
The face value of debt issued rises with the level of risky liabilities, and is positively related to rates and maturity. It falls with asset volatilities and rises with liability volatility and correlation.
The marked value of debt however, rises with the level of risky liabilities, is insensitive to rates, and rises with maturity. It falls with asset volatility, rises with liability volatility and falls with correlation.
The level of reported equity falls with the level of risky liabilities, is insensitive to rates, and falls with maturity. It is positively related to asset volatility, negatively related to liability volatility and decreases with correlation.
The face values of debt issued are uniformly substantially reduced when the debt cone is narrowed.
Conclusion
Markets are modeled as passively accepting a convex cone of cash ‡ows. These cones contain the set of nonnegative cash ‡ows as they are acceptable to all. Di¤erent markets are conceptualized as accepting di¤erent cones and conditions are established to exclude the possibility of arbitrage between markets. Operationally these cones are de…ned by positive expactation under a concave distortion of the distribution function of the cash ‡ow delivered to market. Different cones are then constructed using di¤erent distortions. A two parameter family of distortions is introduced that calibrates the level of loss aversion in markets and the level of the absence of gain enticement.
Firms or corporations are seen as accessing risky assets and risky liabilities where the latter may dominate the former and capital requirements are set by taxpayers via their regulatory bodies to ensure that su¢ cient capital is put at stake by the creators of a …rm to make the residual risk of excess loss acceptable to the taxpayer cone that re ‡ects the highest level of loss aversion and the highest level of absence of gain enticement. Firms approach equity markets that have lowest level of risk aversion and the highest level of gain enticement and can come into existence if they can raise su¢ cient equity capital.
Firms that are allowed to exist approach debt markets using securities particularly attractive to such markets to generate favorable funding opportunities. Debt is however costly as it is marked at the ask price of the debt market though the securities issued raise just the bid price. The di¤erence is the cost of debt and this rises as the debt level is increased and sets a limit to the amount of debt a …rm may issue. This constraint on covering the cost of debt coupled with the clientele e¤ects of debt markets determines the optimal level of debt.
Firms with lognormally distributed and correlated assets and liabilities are analysed for their required capital, their optimal debt levels, the value of the option to put losses back to the taxpayer, the costs of debt and equity, and the level of …nally reported equity in the balance sheet. The relationship between these entities and the risk characteristics of a …rm are analysed and reported in detail. 
